Summary
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha sought to rectify Tech Square Engineering Pvt Ltd's Indian registration of the mark ALPHARD, a luxury vehicle brand Toyota never formally launched in India. A Single Judge had dismissed the rectification petition for want of proof of Indian reputation. The Delhi High Court's Division Bench reversed, holding that unsolicited grey-market imports, online listings, and press coverage since 2008 established trans-border reputation sufficient to qualify ALPHARD as a well-known trade mark. The ruling clarifies that niche luxury markets need not show mass-market penetration to establish goodwill, and that third-party use can count toward establishing a mark's reputation in India.
Background
A luxury multi-purpose vehicle never sold through an authorised dealership in India still found its way into Mumbai driveways, Times of India classifieds, and even the garage of a former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister. That unsolicited demand became the centrepiece of the Toyota ALPHARD trademark dispute, decided by the Delhi High Court on 4 May 2026.
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha (“Toyota”), the Japanese automobile major, adopted the mark ALPHARD in 1986 and began commercial use in 2002 for a luxury MUV sold across more than 170 countries. Tech Square Engineering Pvt Ltd (“Tech Square”) registered the identical mark in India in 2015 on a “proposed to be used” basis, covering Classes 9, 12, and 27. Toyota sought rectification of these registrations under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“Trade Marks Act”), first before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board and, after its abolition, before the Delhi High Court as C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 586/2022. A Single Judge dismissed the petition on 3 February 2023, finding that Toyota had not proven Indian use or reputation predating Tech Square’s adoption. Toyota appealed.
Issues
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- Whether Toyota’s global adoption and use of ALPHARD since 1986 established trans-border reputation in India before Tech Square’s 2015 application, qualifying the mark as well-known under Section 11(6) to 11(10).
- Whether third-party imports and online references constitute “use” attributable to Toyota absent direct commercial sales.
- Whether Tech Square’s adoption of an identical mark, accompanied by inconsistent explanations of its origin, was dishonest.
- Whether the Single Judge correctly applied the territoriality principle drawn from the Supreme Court’s Prius
- Whether the impugned registrations were “wrongly remaining on the Register” under Section 57(2).
Toyota’s Arguments
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- Prior global adoption of ALPHARD since 1986, commercial use since 2002, sales exceeding 850,000 units, and registrations across Japan, China, Singapore, and Malaysia established formidable goodwill.
- Reliance on R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp. ((1996) 5 SCC 714) to argue that reputation transcends territorial boundaries through publicity and dissemination, without requiring actual sale within the jurisdiction.
- Reliance on Trustees of Princeton University v. Vagdevi Educational Society to contend that “use” under Section 2(2)(c)(ii) is not confined to acts of the proprietor and extends to third-party and public-domain references.
- Distinguished the Supreme Court’s Prius ruling on facts, arguing Toyota’s evidentiary record of imports, blogs, and news coverage since 2008 was far stronger than Prius’s negligible Indian footprint.
- Argued Tech Square’s adoption was dishonest, pointing to inconsistent claims that ALPHARD was independently coined versus derived from a star’s name, and to invoices issued in the name of a third party, Tekstar Global Private Limited, with undisclosed cash transactions.
Tech Square’s Arguments
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- Claimed bona fide adoption and continuous commercial use of ALPHARD since 2015 across Classes 9, 12, and 27, including through associated entities.
- Argued ALPHARD was arbitrarily derived from a star’s name for automobile accessories, making the adoption distinctive and honest.
- Relied on Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Vnow Technologies Pvt Ltd to argue Toyota did not qualify as the holder of an “earlier trade mark” under Section 11, lacking locus to object.
- Relied on Sumit Vijay v. Major League Baseball Properties Inc. and the Supreme Court’s Prius ruling to argue that Toyota’s material, being sporadic and third-party in origin, failed to meet the threshold for proving substantial goodwill in India under the territoriality principle.
Court’s Analysis
Scope of Intra-Court Appeal
The court noted that its jurisdiction in an intra-court appeal is narrow, permitting interference only where the Single Judge’s view is demonstrably erroneous or perverse, rather than merely one of several plausible views.
Reading Section 57 with Section 11
Turning to the statutory scheme, the court observed that Section 57 operates as a corrective mechanism allowing removal of marks “wrongly remaining” on the Register, and that this inquiry must be read alongside Section 11, which sets out relative grounds for refusal. The court held that Toyota’s claim depended entirely on whether ALPHARD qualified as an “earlier trade mark” through well-known status, since Toyota held no prior registration or pending application in India.
Reputation in a Niche Luxury Market
The court found that the Single Judge had proceeded on an unduly narrow view of reputation, one demanding a formal commercial launch and direct sales by Toyota itself. The court reasoned that the nature of the goods, high-value luxury vehicles, meant that recognition would naturally be confined to a niche consumer segment rather than the mass market, and that Section 11(6) and 11(7) of the Trade Marks Act do not require broad public penetration to establish well-known status.
Unsolicited Imports as Proof of Goodwill
The court observed that unsolicited third-party imports of the ALPHARD vehicle into India since 2008, evidenced through online listings, blog discussions, and newspaper reports, including coverage of prominent owners, amounted to compelling proof of goodwill precisely because they were unprompted by Toyota. The court reasoned that voluntary importation by consumers reflects pre-existing recognition rather than manufactured evidence.
What Counts as “Use”
The court further held that “use” under Section 2(2)(c)(ii) is not restricted to a proprietor’s own commercial acts, relying on Trustees of Princeton University v. Vagdevi Educational Society, and extends to public-domain material associating a mark with goods or services. On this basis, the court found the Single Judge’s rejection of Toyota’s evidence, on the sole ground that it did not emanate from Toyota, to be inconsistent with binding precedent.
Distinguishing Prius
Distinguishing Prius, the court stated that the Supreme Court had not rejected the doctrine of trans-border reputation but had found the evidentiary record in that case insufficient. The court opined that Toyota’s Toyota ALPHARD trademark evidence, spanning listings, articles, and imports from 2008 onward, was materially stronger than the record in Prius and satisfied the territoriality principle on its own terms.
Dishonest Adoption
On dishonest adoption, the court found that Tech Square’s shifting explanations, alternately describing ALPHARD as independently coined and as derived from a celestial or dictionary reference, undermined its bona fides. The court further found that invoices relied upon by Tech Square, issued to a third party without established corporate nexus and reflecting undocumented cash transactions, lacked evidentiary value. The Toyota ALPHARD trademark, the court concluded, had achieved well-known status in India within the relevant luxury-vehicle segment prior to Tech Square’s application.
Findings
In view of the observations and the arguments presented by both the parties, the Delhi High Court held that:
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- Toyota established prior global adoption of ALPHARD since 1986 and trans-border spill-over reputation in India before Tech Square’s 2015 application, evidenced by unsolicited imports, media coverage, and online listings dating to 2008.
- ALPHARD qualifies as a well-known trade mark under Section 11(6) to 11(10) of the Trade Marks Act and, consequently, as an “earlier trade mark” under the Explanation to Section 11(4).
- Tech Square’s adoption of the identical mark lacked bona fides, given its inconsistent explanations of origin and reliance on unreliable third-party invoices.
- The impugned registrations, Nos. 3093216, 3093218, and 3093219, contravene Section 11 and were “wrongly remaining on the Register” under Section 57(2).
- The Single Judge’s judgment dated 3 February 2023 is set aside, and the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
- The Registrar of Trade Marks is directed to rectify the Register by removing the impugned ALPHARD registrations.
Case Citation: Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Tech Square Engineering Pvt Ltd & Anr., LPA 176/2023, 177/2023 & 178/2023, Delhi High Court, decided on 4 May 2026. Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163516424/
Authored by Gaurav Mishra, IP Attorney, BananaIP Counsels