Summary
In a decisive affirmation of free speech and intermediary protections in the digital age, the Supreme Court of India allowed Wikimedia Foundation Inc.’s appeal against a Delhi High Court direction that mandated removal of user-generated content concerning a pending defamation suit. The apex court held that the High Court’s order disproportionately infringed on the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. It concluded that such restrictions could not be sustained within the constitutional framework.
In a decisive affirmation of free speech and intermediary protections in the digital age, the Supreme Court of India allowed Wikimedia Foundation Inc.’s appeal against a Delhi High Court direction that mandated removal of user-generated content concerning a pending defamation suit. The apex court held that the High Court’s order disproportionately infringed on the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. It concluded that such restrictions could not be sustained within the constitutional framework.
ANI’s Defamation Suit Against Wikimedia
The dispute emanated from a civil suit filed by ANI Media Private Limited (“ANI”) against Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (“Wikimedia”) and others, in which ANI alleged that Wikipedia hosted defamatory content that damaged its reputation. ANI prayed for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from publishing or republishing defamatory content and requested that all such material be removed from Wikipedia. It also demanded the disclosure of identities of editors responsible for the allegedly defamatory edits and claimed damages against Wikimedia.
The Single Judge’s Disclosure Order
On 20 August 2024, a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, noting the plaintiff’s assertion that certain administrators (defendant Nos. 2 to 4) were behind the defamatory edits, directed Wikimedia (defendant No. 1) to disclose their subscriber details to ANI. Wikimedia, through counsel, denied any connection with those administrators. Nevertheless, the court ordered disclosure within two weeks to facilitate service of summons on the concerned individuals. This interim direction became the focal point of the controversy.
Contempt Allegations and Division Bench’s Order
Following this, ANI filed an application seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against Wikimedia, asserting that the disclosure order had been willfully disobeyed. ANI pointed to the continued presence of an article page and talk page on Wikipedia, which criticized the order of the Single Judge.
Taking a grave view, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, on 16 October 2024, concluded that the said publications and online discussions amounted to interference with judicial proceedings and violated the sub judice principle. The Division Bench opined that the content posted on Wikipedia, a platform managed by the appellant, “bordered on contempt” and directed Wikimedia to delete the pages and associated discussions within thirty-six hours. While passing its order, the Bench expressed concern over the openness of these discussions and their potential influence on ongoing judicial proceedings, viewing them as deliberate acts of pressure on the court.
Wikimedia’s Appeal: Intermediary Role and Freedom of Expression
Wikimedia appealed this direction before the Supreme Court, contending that it functions merely as an intermediary under Section 2(1)(w) read with Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. It asserted that it neither publishes nor monitors the content on its platform and therefore cannot be held liable for third-party information hosted on Wikipedia. The content cited in the High Court’s order, it argued, was derived from publicly available secondary sources and did not amount to contempt or obstruction of justice.
Wikimedia further argued that the High Court’s takedown order violated constitutional protections, including the freedom of speech and expression and the right to access information, as well as the principle of open justice. It contended that such directions would have a chilling effect on public discourse and undermine the digital freedoms integral to democratic functioning.
SC on Free Speech, Sub Judice and Judicial Sensitivity
The Supreme Court agreed with Wikimedia’s contentions and delivered a judgment that reaffirmed the primacy of constitutional rights in judicial oversight of online content. Relying on precedents including Sahara India Real Estate Corp. v. SEBI, Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Indian Express, and Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India, the Court held that any restriction on publication must meet the threshold of a “real and substantial risk” to the administration of justice. Based on the facts before it, the apex court held that such a risk had not been established in the present case.
While arriving at its decision, the Court stated that criticism of judicial proceedings, even when ongoing, would not be per se contemptuous unless it scandalizes the court or materially interferes with the administration of justice. It observed that open justice is a cornerstone of democratic judicial systems and warned against disproportionate judicial sensitivity to public commentary. Courts, the judgment said, must not resort to censorship-like measures without satisfying constitutional standards of necessity and proportionality.
While refraining from opining on Wikimedia’s intermediary status due to the pending suit, the Court held that the Division Bench had overreached by directing takedown of the Wikipedia pages without adequate reasoning or basis. It reaffirmed that court-ordered content removals must be narrowly tailored and justified under Article 19(2) as a reasonable restriction on free speech.
A Caution Against Judicial Overreach
The Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of the High Court’s approach, stating that it reacted disproportionately and ventured into regulating speech in a manner unsupported by law or precedent. Reiterating the foundational role of free expression and access to information in a democracy, the Court cautioned against judicial directives that could suppress public debate, especially in digital spaces that host user-generated discussions.
Accordingly, The Supreme Court set aside paragraph 5 of the Division Bench’s order dated 16 October 2024—which directed Wikimedia to delete the article and associated talk page.
Free Criticism and Judge’s Response
In its decision, the Court cited several cases, and I am hereby reproducing specific paragraphs from an opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer that spells out how Courts and Judges have to respond when their orders are criticized.
“29.1. In his concurring opinion Justice Krishna Iyer culled out several principles. Relevant portion of his opinion reads thus:
The first rule in this branch of contempt power is a wise economy of use by the court of this branch of its jurisdiction. The court will act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardised by a gross and/or unfounded attack on the Judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process. The court is willing to ignore, by a majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences — the dogs may bark, the caravan will pass.
The court will not be prompted to act as a result of an easy irritability. Much rather, it shall take a noetic look at the conspectus of features and be guided by a constellation of constitutional and other considerations when it chooses to use, or desist from using, its power of contempt.
The second principle must be to harmonise the constitutional values of free criticism, the Fourth Estate included, and the need for a fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. A happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the doubt being given generously against the Judge, slurring over marginal deviations but severely proving the supremacy of the law over pugnacious, vicious, unrepentant and malignant contemners, be they the powerful press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran columnists of olympian establishmentarians. Not because the Judge, the human symbol of a high value, is personally armoured by a regal privilege but because “be you — the contemner — ever so high, the law — the people’s expression of justice — is above you”. Curial courage overpowers arrogant might even as judicial benignity forgives errant or exaggerated critics. Indeed, to criticise the Judge fairly, albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary right, twice blessed in a democracy For, it blesseth him that gives and him that takes. Where freedom of expression, fairly exercised, subserves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it, constitutionally speaking. A free people are the ultimate guarantors of fearless justice
29.2. Justice Iyer culled out four more principles. The third principle is to avoid confusion between personal protection of a libeled Judge and prevention of obstruction of public justice (and the community’s confidence in that great process). While the former is not contempt, the latter is although there can be an overlapping between the two situations. According to him, the fourth functional canon which controls discretionary exercise of the contempt power by the court is that the media which is an indispensable intermediary between the state and the people and a necessary instrumentality in strengthening the forces of democracy, should be given free play within responsible limits even when the focus of its critical attention is the court, including the highest court. The next normative guideline i.e. the fifth is that Judges should not be hypersensitive even when distortions and criticisms overstep the limits; Judges should deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude. Finally, and that is the sixth principle, after evaluating the totality of factors, if the court considers the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must strike a blow. This is to uphold public interest and public justice.
29.3. Justice Krishna Iyer referred to a judgment of Lord Denning and observed that it was a very valuable and remarkably fresh approach to the question of criticism of courts in intemperate language and invocation of contempt of court against the contemnor. Justice Krishna Iyer highlighted a few observations of Lord Denning as under:
A very valuable and remarkably fresh approach to this question of criticism of courts in intemperate language and invocation of contempt of court against the contemner, a person of high position, is found in Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex. p. Blackburn. Lord Denning’s judgment is particularly instructive in the context of the obnoxious comments made by Quintin Hogg in an article in the “Punch” about the members of the Court of Appeal. The remarks about the Court of Appeal were highly obnoxious and the barbed words thrown at the Judges obviously were provocative. Even so, in a brief but telling judgment, Lord Denning held this not to be contempt of court. It is illuminating to excerpt a few observations of the learned Judge:
This is the first case, so far as I know, where this Court has been called on to consider an allegation of contempt against itself. It is a jurisdiction which undoubtedly belongs to us but which we will most sparingly exercise: more particularly as we ourselves have an interest in the matter.
Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.
It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.
Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done.”
Citation: Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private Limited, Civil Appeal No. 5391 of 2025 (India, Supreme Court, May 9, 2025), available at: http://indiankanoon.org/doc/107127594/, visited on: 11/05/2025.
