Copyright Infringement Complaints and Groundless Threats The plaintiffs are a manufacturer and the authorized online reseller of silver plated religious articles, including a Kamdhenu cow idol, sold under the brand Dev Aastha on Amazon. In April 2026, Defendant No. 1, a competitor selling similar products under the brand Svastika, filed successive copyright infringement complaints against the plaintiffs’ product listings on Amazon. Amazon deactivated the listings without giving the plaintiffs any prior opportunity to be heard. After some listings were reinstated on Amazon’s own evaluation, Defendant No. 1 filed a fresh complaint covering six connected listings, causing them to be deactivated again.<\/p>\n
At no point did Defendant No. 1 institute a suit for copyright infringement before any court of competent jurisdiction. In its refiled complaint, the field marked Copyright No. did not carry any valid registration particulars; it contained only the URL of Defendant No. 1’s own product page on its website. When the plaintiffs sought clarification, Defendant No. 1 characterised the differences between the two products as “finish and minor base variations” that are “superficial in nature.”<\/p>\n
The plaintiffs submitted as follows:<\/p>\n
Defendant No. 1 did not appear before the court at this stage. In its reply to the plaintiffs’ legal notice, Defendant No. 1 stated as follows:<\/p>\n
Groundless Threats Through Marketplace Complaints After reviewing the facts of the case, the court started its analysis by referring to Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which gives a remedy to a person who receives groundless threats of legal proceedings for alleged copyright infringement. Noting that such threats may be made by circulars, advertisements, or otherwise, the court stated that the word \u201cotherwise\u201d was wide enough to include complaints made through an online marketplace complaint mechanism, especially when such complaints affect the business of the person against whom they are made.<\/p>\n
The court then considered the effect of Defendant No. 1\u2019s complaints on Amazon and noted that the complaints did not remain private objections between two competitors, but they resulted in the deactivation of the plaintiffs\u2019 product listings and affected their ability to sell their products online. As per the court, once a marketplace complaint produces such commercial consequences without any adjudication by a competent court, it can fall within the scope of groundless threats under Section 60 of the Copyright Act at the prima facie stage.<\/p>\n
Relying on Associated Broadcasting Company Limited v. Google LLC and Others, the court stated that a copyright strike notice or a platform level takedown complaint, without the institution and diligent prosecution of a meaningful infringement action before a competent court, constitutes a groundless threat within the meaning of Section 60. Applying that principle, the court concluded that Defendant No. 1 could not keep using Amazon\u2019s complaint mechanism to disable the plaintiffs\u2019 listings while avoiding an infringement action before a competent court. The court also made it clear that a marketplace complaint cannot decide whether infringement has actually taken place, and that it can only trigger platform action. Since Defendant No. 1 had not instituted any infringement suit as on the date of filing of the plaintiffs\u2019 suit, the court held that the complaints made on Amazon amounted to prima facie groundless threats.<\/p>\n
The court next examined what Defendant No. 1 had placed on record to support its copyright complaint, and observed that the reply to the plaintiffs\u2019 legal notice did not disclose clear particulars of copyright registration, originality, or prior use. The court also noted that the refiled complaint did not contain a valid copyright number, and that the field meant for copyright particulars carried only the URL of Defendant No. 1\u2019s own commercial product page.<\/p>\n
In the court\u2019s view, this absence of basic copyright particulars weakened Defendant No. 1\u2019s claim at the interim stage because a party invoking a platform\u2019s intellectual property mechanism must at least disclose the basis of the right it claims. As Defendant No. 1 had neither filed a suit nor shown clear particulars of the copyright asserted by it, the court treated the repeated takedown complaints as prima facie unjustified rather than as a bona fide assertion of copyright.<\/p>\n
Copyright Lost Through Industrial Production The court then turned to Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, which deals with the position where an artistic work is applied to an article by an industrial process. Relying on Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar & Co., the court stated that copyright in such an artistic work ceases to subsist once the design has been applied more than fifty times by an industrial process.<\/p>\n
The court noted that Defendant No. 1\u2019s own website showed that its products had been commercially produced in quantities exceeding fifty units. Based on this material, and applying Section 15(2), the court held that Defendant No. 1 did not, prima facie, appear to hold any enforceable copyright in the asserted artistic work. This finding further weakened the foundation of the takedown complaints because the complaints were based on a copyright that did not appear to subsist at the prima facie stage.<\/p>\n
The court also considered the nature of the subject matter claimed by Defendant No. 1, which was a Kamdhenu cow with calf. According to the court, the plaintiffs\u2019 contention that Kamdhenu cow with calf is a sacred motif drawn from the Hindu religious tradition and forms part of the public domain appeared to be well founded at this stage.<\/p>\n
In the court\u2019s view, the elements relied upon by Defendant No. 1 were stock motifs that flowed from the underlying public domain subject matter, and such elements could not be monopolised through copyright merely because they were used in a commercial product. Applying the idea expression dichotomy, the court stated that these elements were incapable of attracting copyright protection at the prima facie stage because they arose from a religious and cultural motif already available in the public domain.<\/p>\n
Superficial Differences and Substantial Similarity The court further considered Defendant No. 1\u2019s own description of the differences between the competing products. Defendant No. 1 had described the differences as \u201cfinish and minor base variations\u201d and \u201csuperficial in nature,\u201d and the court treated this statement as relevant while considering whether the copyright complaint had a sustainable basis at the interim stage.<\/p>\n
As per the court, this statement did not strengthen Defendant No. 1\u2019s claim of infringement because the asserted copyright itself appeared unclear, affected by Section 15(2), and based on a public domain motif. In that context, the court observed that any claim of substantial similarity could not be sustained at this stage, particularly when Defendant No. 1 had not pursued a proper infringement action before a competent court.<\/p>\n
Having considered the absence of an infringement suit, the lack of clear copyright particulars, the effect of Section 15(2), the public domain character of the Kamdhenu cow motif, and Defendant No. 1\u2019s own description of the differences between the products, the court viewed the repeated takedown complaints as more than a mere assertion of copyright. In the court\u2019s view, the complaints appeared to be a misuse of Amazon\u2019s intermediary complaint mechanism.<\/p>\n
The court stated that the repeated complaints had the effect of suppressing and undermining the plaintiffs\u2019 business operations, because the listings were taken down through a platform process without any adjudication of infringement. Since Defendant No. 1 had not approached a competent court for determination of its claim, the court held that its conduct squarely attracted the remedy under Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957.<\/p>\n
Prima Facie Case, Balance of Convenience, and Irreparable Harm The court finally considered whether the plaintiffs had made out a case for ex parte ad interim relief. As per the court, the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the threats issued by Defendant No. 1 were unjustified, especially because the complaints had led to deactivation of listings without any court proceeding by Defendant No. 1 to establish infringement.<\/p>\n
The court also took note of the plaintiffs\u2019 substantial inventory lying in Amazon\u2019s Fulfilment Centres, which was supported by tax invoices. In the court\u2019s view, continued deactivation of the listings would expose the plaintiffs to business loss and reputational harm, while Defendant No. 1 had not shown a clear enforceable copyright or instituted a suit to vindicate its alleged rights. On this basis, the court held that the balance of convenience lay in favour of the plaintiffs, and that irreparable injury would follow if an ex parte ad interim injunction was not granted.<\/p>\n
The court held as follows:<\/p>\n
Paragraph 23: “In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the prima facie view that Section 60 of the Act is attracted in the facts of the present case. As held in Associated Broadcasting (supra), the making of a complaint to a marketplace platform falls within the ambit of a groundless threat of legal proceedings. The said decision further clarifies that the issuance of a copyright strike notice or platform-level takedown complaint, without the institution and diligent prosecution of a meaningful infringement action before a competent Court, constitutes a “groundless threat” within the meaning of Section 60 of the Act. Since a strike notice or marketplace complaint cannot, by itself, resolve the dispute on the question of infringement, the proviso to Section 60 is not satisfied. In the present case, Defendant No. 1 had not instituted any suit for infringement as on the date of filing of the present Suit, and the Reply to the Legal Notice also does not disclose any clear particulars of copyright registration, originality, or prior use.”<\/p>\n
Paragraph 24: “The Plaintiffs have further contended that Defendant No. 1 does not enjoy copyright in any underlying artistic work, inasmuch as the same has been industrially reproduced more than fifty times, thereby attracting Section 15(2) of the Act. In this regard, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Microfibres Inc. (supra), copyright in such a work ceases to subsist once the design has been applied more than fifty times by an industrial process. Accordingly, Defendant No. 1 does not, prima facie, appear to hold any enforceable copyright in view of Section 15(2) of the Act considering the admission on Defendant No. 1’s website, https:\/\/svastika.in, that the products of Defendant No. 1 have been commercially produced in quantities exceeding fifty units.”<\/p>\n
Paragraph 25: “Additionally, the Plaintiffs’ contention that the Kamdhenu cow with calf constitutes a sacred motif drawn from the Hindu religious tradition and forms part of the public domain appears, at this stage, to be well founded, since the elements relied upon by Defendant No. 1 are stock motifs that flow inevitably from the underlying public-domain subject and are, therefore, incapable of attracting copyright protection in view of the settled idea-expression dichotomy.”<\/p>\n
Paragraph 27: “In these circumstances, the repeated takedown complaints lodged by Defendant No. 1 appear to be a misuse of Amazon’s intermediary complaint mechanism with a view to suppressing and undermining the Plaintiffs’ business operations. Such conduct of Defendant No. 1 squarely attracts the remedy under Section 60 of the Act, which entitles any person aggrieved by groundless threats of legal proceedings or liability in respect of an alleged copyright infringement to seek relief therein. Accordingly, the threats issued by Defendant No. 1 are, prima facie, groundless within the meaning of Section 60 of the Act.”<\/p>\n
Paragraph 29: “Therefore, the Plaintiffs have, at this stage, been able to establish a prima facie case to the effect that the threats issued by the Defendant No. 1 are unjustified. In the event the Defendant No. 1 is not restrained from issuing further groundless threats, the Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable loss and injury. There exists a real and imminent risk of substantial reputational and business harm being occasioned to the Plaintiffs on account of such conduct of Defendant No. 1. Further, Defendant No. 2 is also required to be directed to reinstate the products of the Plaintiffs that are deactivated pursuant to the complaints filed by Defendant No. 1. Accordingly, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant No. 1, and irreparable injury would ensue to the Plaintiffs if an ex-parte ad interim injunction is not granted.”<\/p>\n
Avaia Ventures Private Limited v. Wildship Enterprises Private Limited, High Court of Delhi, 5 May 2026, CS(COMM) 478\/2026.<\/p>\n